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The Court saw a situation in which the strict interpretation of the
statute of limitations was causing harsh consequences, decided not
to wait for legislative action to change the wording of the statute,
and acted on its own authority to give the patient an effective means
of obtaining relief. Hopefully this will bring about the enactment
of legislation which will change the wording of the present statute
and incorporate the discovery rule into its actual language.
Michael W. Hawkins
CONSTITmtIONAL LAw-DFENDANT'S BiGHT TO A JuRY TRIAI-Is Six
ENouGH?-In Williams v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court
held that a twelve-man jury is not a necessary part of "trial by jury"
and that a six-man panel does not violate a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights as applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 The reasons put forth by the Court for overturning a constitu-
tional mandate which has existed since at least 18982 are not only
inadequate, but are not in fact the basis for the decision. An examina-
tion of the Court's rationale reveals that no basis for change was
found; only an absence of evidence strong enough to prevent the
removal of the constitutional requirement. The choice the Court
posed for itself was not between a twelve-man jury and a smaller
panel, but rather was a choice between continued recognition of a
constitutional right and harmonious development of a judicially
190 S. Ct. 1893 (1970). Williams, charged with robbery, filed a pretrial
motion in a Florida state court to impanel a twelve-man jury rather than the
six-man jury as provided by Florida law in all criminal cases except those
designated as capital. "Twelve men shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases,
and six men shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases. F A. STAT. ANN.
§ 913.10(1) (1967). Petitioner claimed that the statute violated his sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial. The motion was denied and petitioner was convicted
as charged and given a sentence of life imprisonment. The Florida District Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Certiorari was granted on petitioner's subse-
quent appeal to the United States Supreme Court which affirmed. 90 S. Ct. 1893,
1907 (1970). Petitioner filed a second pretrial motion seeking to be excused
from FLA. R. Cmnm. P. 1.200 which required, among other things, a defendant,
on written demand of the prosecuting attorney, to give advance notice if he
planned to claim an alibi andto furnish the prosecuting attorney with information
such as the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to call. Williams contended
that these requirements violated his constitutional rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments not to be compelled to testify against himself. This motion
was denied by the Florida court and affirmed on the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898 (1970). The Court found that the notice-of-
alibi rule required nothing additional of the defendant nor bound him to pretrial
acts. The only effect was to force him to make decisions about his defense at an
earlier date but he still retained the right to change that defense. Id.
2 See note 4, infra, and accompanying text.
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created canon of constitutional construction. The raison retre of the
decision was the conflict between these concepts but, contrary to
Justice Harlan's thesis,3 the compelling reasons why the Court chose
as it did will be found apart from these two factors. The development
of this thesis requires dissection of the opinion in Williams in three
main parts: first, a discussion of the problem which prompted the
decision; second, an examination of the majority opinion to illustrate
exactly what was and was not shown; and third, a suggestion as to
one of the real reasons for the decision. When combined these three
inquiries raise the haunting question which makes Williams worthy
of comment: was the issue of the existence of constitutional strictures
on jury size resolved by jurisprudentially sound methods?
The development of the twelve-man jury panel to its eventual
conflict with the incorporation doctrine began with Thompson v.
Utah.4 The historical belief that the sixth amendment required, at
least in federal courts, a twelve-man jury in criminal cases was based
on the decision in Thompson. There two defendants were charged
with grand larceny and were tried in federal court while Utah was
still a territory. After a verdict of guilty, defendants successfully
applied for a new trial. Prior to the date of the new trial, Utah was
admitted as a state and the second trial was conducted in state court
with only eight jurors as provided by the Utah constitution. De-
fendants were convicted and subsequently prosecuted their appeal
to the United States Supreme Court.5 The Supreme Court overturned
the state conviction on the basis that the Utah law was ex post facto
in its application to felonies committed prior to the time Utah became
a state because the United States Constitution, through the sixth
amendment, required that the jury, in federal court, consist of twelve
men.6 It was this constitutional holding which would eventually come
into conflict with the Court's incorporation scheme, but this could
not happen until the jury, with its complex of facets (twelve-man
panel, unanimity, etc.), was itself incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment. However, Thompson was accepted as law with little
3 See note 70, infra, and accompanying text.
4 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
5 Id. at 344-45.
0 Id. at 355. There the Court stated:
In our opinion, the provision in the constitution of Utah providing for
the trial in courts of general jurisdiction of criminal cases, not capital,
by a jury composed of eight persons, is ex post facto in its application to
felonies committed before the Territory became a State, because, in
respect of such crimes, the Constitution of the United States gave the
accused, at the time of the commission of his offence the right to be tried
by a jury of twelve persons, and made it impossible to deprive him of
his liberty except by the unanimous verdict of such a jury.
1971]
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discussion.7 Indeed, the idea that twelve men were required in
federal criminal trials was so accepted that the rule was incorporated
into the rules of federal court procedure in criminal cases.8
States, on the other hand, were allowed to fix the number of
jurors in criminal cases as they saw fit, with only minor consideration
of possible violations of constitutional rights.9 This divergence of
procedure as to the required number of jurors produced no conflict
with the incorporation doctrine until 1968 in the case of Duncan v.
Louisiana,10 where the Court held "trial by jury in criminal cases
[to be] fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and that the
fourteenth amendment guaranteed a jury trial to a defendant in state
court where the sixth amendment would so require if he were in
federal court.'
By this incorporation of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial
into the fourteenth, the Court created inconsistencies which inevitably
led to Williams. These inconsistencies centered around the required
number of jurors. Following Duncan, the law required jury trials in
both federal and state courts under certain conditions. These condi-
tions were identical in both state and federal courts; 12 however, a
defendant in state court might face a jury of any number so long as
it could fairly be called a jury.13 This disparity of procedure, which
had been permissible before Duncan, now produced a state of affairs
contrary to the usual result of "incorporation" of constitutional rights
into the fourteenth amendment.' 4
Previously, all such decisions had held that each federal right
so incorporated was "applicable to the States with all the subtleties
and refinements born of history and embodied in case experience
developed in the context of federal adjudication."15 While this state-
ment of the policy may be a bit strong, it is nonetheless indicative of
the completeness of such absorptions. In fact, the Court had previously
stated that "[o]nce it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights
guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice .. , the
7 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1898, 1901 nn.29-31 (1970).
8 FED. R. Cam. P. 23. See Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1920 n.13 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
9 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1900). For a listing of the various
state laws and their differences see the appendix to Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent.
Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. at 1926-28.103 91 U.S. 145 (1968).
13 Id. at 149.
12 Id.
13 See appendix, supra note 9.
'
4 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
15 Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1922 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal
Government."' 6
In Williams the Court was squarely faced with the conflict be-
tween a constitutional right and the incorporation procedure, and if
the policy of complete absorption as stated above was to continue,
the Court would have to make some decision about the required
number of jurors. Either the states would be required to provide
juries of twelve in all cases where the federal courts would so require
or juries of twelve would not be required in either state or federal
courts.17 The latter choice would require the Court to find that a jury
of twelve was not constitutionally required in federal court by the
sixth amendment, and thus overrule Thompson.'8 In Williams the
Court chose to dilute the constitutional standard of Thompson in favor
of retaining intact the incorporation scheme. 19 The decision was
reached on the basis of ambiguous historical facts and the absence of
empirical data to refute the justices' personal determination of human
behavior. Confirmation of this hypothesis will be discovered through
an examination of the reasoning utilized in the majority opinion.
In reaching the decision that the twelve-man panel was not an
essential feature of trial by jury, the analysis of the majority in
Williams was based on a three step approach: first, a discussion of
the historical development of the jury and the twelve-man panel
coupled with a review of the judicial precedent behind the require-
ment; second, consideration of the adoption of the sixth amendment
to determine whether the Framers of the Constitution had intended
to include the twelve-man panel in the jury requirement; and third,
an analysis of the jury's function as relates to its size.
First considering the historical development of the jury to de-
termine its relationship to the twelve-man feature,2 0 the court gave
brief consideration to various historical treatises2' and came to the
conclusion that the jury of twelve men appeared "to have been an
historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise
to the jury in the first place."22 The Court's conclusion that the choice
'
6 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1965). See Williams v. Florida,
90 S. Ct. 1914 (Marshall J., dissenting).
'7 There was the third option of allowing the diversity to exist but this
apparently was not considered. See note 72 infra, and accompanying text.
'
8 See Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. at 1919-21 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19"Our holding does no more than leave these considerations to Congress and
the States, unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment which would
forever dictate the precise number which can constitute a jury." Id. at 1907
(majority opinion).
20 Id. at 1899.
21 Id. at 1899-1900 nn.19-25.
22 Id. at 1900.
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of twelve jurors as the appropriate number was accidental is in all
probability a valid one. The authorities cited by the Court reach
or tend to lead to that conclusion.23 Likewise other writers have
reached a similar conclusion upon an independent review of the
history of the development of the jury.24 Even Justice Harlan, in
dissent, was unable to present any authority to show that there was
some reason, apart from chance, for the selection of twelve as the
appropriate number.25 He did, however, question the second part of
the Court's conclusion that the number twelve is unrelated to the
purposes which gave rise to the jury. Accepting the majority's state-
ment of the purposes of a jury,26 Harlan concluded that although the
settlement on this number was accidental, it is an accident which
has occurred continuously since the fourteenth century, which indi-
cates a reflection of the policies behind the jury in the form of the
jury.2 7 Indeed he feels that "[t]he right to a trial by jury... has no
enduring meaning apart from historical form." 28
The important aspect of the use of history in this case, however,
is not its accuracy but rather the actual purpose it served. In prior
decisions, history had been used for the breaking of long lines of
precedent, but always the Court was able to find in the history the
"fact or "truth" which called for the change of position.29 The
history relied upon was often suspect,30 but this was not the case in
Williams; rather the history used may be accepted as valid. Yet
nowhere in the history did the Court find a reason for removing the
23 See note 21 supra.24 See, e.g., Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, I VALPARAso U.L.
ltv. 1 (1966); Wiehl, The Six-man Jury, 4 GONZA A L. REv. 35 (1968).25 90 S. Ct. at 1919 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an indication of his willing-
ness to challenge the validity of the majority's facts, see Hadley v. Junior College
District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (dissent); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)(dissent); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (dissent).26 See note 55 infra, and accompanying text.
2790 S. Ct. at 1919 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28 Id. It must be kept in mind that Justice Harlan is speaking of federal juries.29 
"Historical adjudication ... supplies an apparent rationale for politically
inspired activism that can be indulged in the name of constitutional continuity."
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. BEv. 119, 131(1965). Kelly views the Court as employing four distinct types of history or
historical research: first, history as the study of precedent; second, history as
the circumstances surrounding the precedent; third, creation of history by judicial
fiat; and fourth, history as an extended essay of the 'law-office" type (using only
that which is favorable). Id. at 121-22. The Williams opinion utiliz.ed all four types.
30 Id. at 132. Kelly is quite critical of much of the Courts use of history,
especially the historical essay from its inception in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How.
393 (1857) and the Income Tax Cases, Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Kelly, supra note 29, at 125-26.
See the apportionment cases cited supra note 25. He compares this use of history




constitutional requirement, instead it found no historical reason
preventing the removal.3 ' In evaluating the Court's decision the his-
tory relied upon must be considered at most neutral, and thus
eleminated as a basis for the holding. In addition, other commentators
have felt that while history is important for revealing the function
which the jury has served, any appraisal must be based on "con-
temporary attitudes, needs and values."32 In view of the position of
the jury as arbitrator in disputes arising from contemporary circum-
stances, the reluctance to rely upon an historical basis for the number
of jurors seems appropriate.33
Having found no historical reason for retaining this "accidental"
feature of the jury, the majority then turned to determining whether
the twelve-man jury "has been immutably codified into our Con-
stitution."3 4 The Court was immediately faced with two obstacles,
the first of which was Thompson and the line of cases following it.35
Thompson was disposed of by arguing that the holding that a twelve-
man panel was constitutionally required in federal court was un-
necessary for the decision in that case36 The majority reasoned that
the application of the ex post facto ruling could have equally rested
on the basis of rights previously allowed Thompson rather than on a
direct conflict between state law and constitutional rights.37 This argu-
ment seems particularly weak when compared to the stated holding
in Thompson that the application of state law was ex post facto
because the United States Constitution gave defendants in federal
courts the right to a jury of twelve.38 Unsatisfied, the Court further
attacked the Thompson Court's reasoning that the jury as known at
common law had been completely incorporated by the Constitution.39
The majority found that:
31 To read the Sixth Amendment as forever codifying a feature so in-
cidental to the real purpose of the Amendment ... would require con-
siderably more evidence than we have been able to discover in the history
and language of the Constitution or in the reasoning of our past decisions.
00 S. Ct. 1907.
32 Clark, supra note 24 at 1-2. See also Kelly, supra note 29 at 156-57.
33 This reluctance applies equally to arguments for decreasing the number ofjurors as well as for retaining the twelve-man panel requirement.
34 90 S. Ct. 1900 (1970).35 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Rassmussen v. United States,
197 U.S. 516 (1905); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).3690 S. Ct. at 1900. See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
37 Id.
38 See note 6 supra. Accord, Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1920 n.12 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
30 90 S. Ct. at 1901. It should be noted that the Court specifically reserved
judgment on what effect the seventh amendment might have on the size of a jury.
Id. at 1901 n.30. Neither did the Court consider the constitutional necessity for
unanimity under the sixth amendment. Id. at 1906 n.46.
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[N]oticeably absent [in the Thompson opinion] was any discussion
of the essential step in the argument; namely, that every feature
of the jury as it existed at common law-whether incidental or
essential to that institution-was necessarily included in the Con-
stitution wherever that document referred to a 'jury.'40
The cases following Thompson were disposed of in Williams by de-
claring that they were often merely dicta and if not, then ill-considered
opinions.41
With Thompson abandoned, the majority was itself forced to the
"essential step" of determining whether it was "the intent of the
Framers" to include the twelve-man panel in the sixth amendment.
42
In trying to determine exactly what the intent of the Framers was,
the Court relied upon the discussions and maneuvering in the adop-
tion of the vicinage requirements. 43 The amendment as originally in-
troduced by Madison called for juries in criminal cases drawn from
the "vicinage,"44 unanimity, challenge, and "other accustomed re-
quisites."45 The syllogistic approach of the Williams majority was
based on three theories: first, that vicinage was as much a part of
the common law jury structure as the twelve-man panel yet simple
reference to trial by jury did not lead the Framers to the belief that
the term included vicinage; second, the Framers successfully pre-
vented the coupling of the jury trial to the accustomed requisites in
the Constitution; and third, the legislative activity of that time took
particular pains to include specific provisions invoking desired aspects
of the common law, yet did not include a requirement of twelve
jurors.46 With these theories as parameters the failure of the amend-
ment to pass as written, the absence of vicinage as known at common
law, and the complete deletion of the unanimity requirement and
"other accustomed requisites" clause led the majority in Williams to
conclude that Congress did not intend to include the twelve-man
panel requirement within the right to trial by jury in the sixth
amendment.47
While their authenticity is probably unquestionable, the facts
marshalled by the Court are subject to varying interpretations. Indeed
the absence of explicit reference by the Framers to the twelve-man
40 Id. at 1901.
41 Id. But see id. at 1920-21 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1902 (majority opinion).
43 Id.44 Vicinage, used in connection with jury, means a panel drawn from the
neighborhood or community. Id. at 1902 n.35.
45 Id. at 1902-03 [quoted from 1 ANNAI.s oF CoNe. 452 (1789)].
46 Id. at 1904.
47 Id. at 1903-05.
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panel, upon which the majority so heavily relied, may just as logically
be turned against the Court's decision. If in fact the Framers were
so conscious of the need for including specific attributes which might
be separated from the common law concept of the jury as the majority
claims, then not only the failure to include but the failure to even
consider48 the twelve-man panel would seem to indicate the assump-
tion that this factor was so attached to the concept of trial by jury
that any discussion would have been superfluous.4 9 The Court ac-
knowledged such a possibility but pointed to the diversity of jury
systems within the colonies which differed from the common law
twelve-man panel.50 In the final analysis the conclusion was that
the Framers probably gave little thought to the question, and "...
there is absolutely no indication in 'the intent of the Framers' of an
explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common law char-
acteristics of the jury."51
It should be obvious that the history used by the Court in its
judicial and constitutional analysis suffers from the same weaknesses
as that used in the historical analysis. While the facts that are
presented are probably accurate, all of the facts simply are not
available and those available are ambiguous. 52 Yet Thompson was re-
futed because the Court could not find the explicitM intent to require
twelve jurors but neither was the majority able to find any intent not
to require such juries. In the end the Court was forced to acknowledge
that history provides no comfort to either position.54
Failing to find codification in the Constitution, and disposing of
Thompson's precedent, the Court turned to its final consideration:
whether a twelve-man jury is indispensable to the essential function
of a jury system. In Duncan the purpose of a jury had been found
to be prevention of oppression by the government.55 In Williams
this purpose led the Court to the determination that:
[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the common-sense judg-
ment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility which results from that group's determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is not a
48 Id. at 1902-04 nn.35-42.
40 Id. at 1918 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5o Id. at 1904-05 n.45 (majority opinion).
51 Id. at 1905.
52 Id. at 1902-03 nn.33-39.
5S See note 51 supra, and accompanying text.
54 Id.55 Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
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function of the particular number of the body which makes up
the jury.5o (Emphasis added.)
A check of the authorities cited by the Court finds no study which
directly and explicitly gives empirical evidence showing that jury
verdicts will not vary according to the size of the panel.57 While
some of the authorities conclude that there should be no difference
in the deliberative processes in six and twelve-man juries, this does
not mean that in fact there would be no difference."8 Conversely,
there seems to be no factual study explicitly indicating that there
would be a change in verdicts resulting from a variation in panel
size.50
Regardless of this absence of evidence, and contrary to the finding
of the Court, there must be at least some relationship between func-
tion and number or else just one juror would be a sufficient buffer
between the accused and his accuser. If one man were sufficient then
it would seem that the presence of the judge would eliminate the
concept of a jury in its function as a buffer. It would follow then that
the number of people chosen bears some relation to the function of
the jury. It was to these ideas that Justice Harlan was responding
when he asked what number of jurors would be too few.60 The
majority's answer was only that if there was a minimum, six was
above it, but the opinion gave no guidelines for determining the
matter.61
56 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1906 (1970).
57 Id. at 1906-07 nn.48-49. The studies in n.48 deal primarily with the time
saving features of the smaller jury.
58 The studies seem to indicate that the minority on a jury would be in-
fluenced, following the first ballot, by the proportional size of the majority. From
this basis the Court reasoned that as the jury decreased in size the number of
jurors the defendant would have to persuade to his side would decrease. Therefore
the defendant should not be complaining. Id. at 1906-07 n.49. These facts can be
viewed in another light. Assume a given number of jurors have been persuaded
and that they will be swayed by the proportional division against them. Assume
four is the minimum number needed to prevent an opposing verdict with a
twelve-man jury and that only two are needed with a six-man panel. If the
number of jurors actually persuaded is three it is obvious that the verdict will
vary with the size of the jury.59 See Erlanger, Jury Research in America, 4 LAw & SociETY 345 (1970) for
a listing and discussion of most of the empirical studies of the jury. Throughout
this paper changes in verdicts as a result of changes in size are used to show a
relationship between function and number. The equating of function to verdicts
seems natural, for although the jury ma have other "functions" (citizen participa-
tion, etc.) they have no meaning apart from the process of rendering verdicts.60 90 S. Ct. at 1919 (Harlan., J., dissenting). . ..
611 at190 n.8 majrit opnio).If her isa mnium why does it
exis? I thre s anumbr byon whch ny dcrese estoysthe jury it must be
because there is some relationshp betwen fuction and number. It would follow
then that if the Court real means tat there is no relationship between function
and number then no number would be too small, even zero. But see Baldwin v.
New York, 90 S. Ct. 1886 (1970) requiring a jury rather than a three judge panel.
[Vol. 591004
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The Court went on to consider other arguments against decreasing
the size of the jury panel such as: the danger of tampering, the
greater difficulty of finding the one juror to "hang' the jury, and the
decreased possibility of obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community. In each instance, however, the Court found no significant
difference due to a decrease from twelve-man to six-man juries.62
Repeating the practices of the Court's historical analysis, the holding
that the number of jurors bore no relationship to their function was
in reality based upon the absence of evidence showing that there
was any connection. 3 Once again, as in its prior reasoning, the
Court found no reason for eliminating the constitutional guarantee,
but rather found no reason against eliminating it.64 To summarize,
the Court found no basis, in history or in fact, to prevent holding that
the twelve-man jury was not constitutionally required; but likewise,
the majority found nothing (at least stated nothing) to support
reversal of the construction of a constitutional mandate that had
stood since 1898. In the final analysis, all that can be said for the
majority's rationale is that it provides no basis either one way or
the other for the holding. In no case did the majority find any
connection between the number of jurors and these bases of authority
of such significance as to require a nullification of the Florida law in
this instance. 5
The importance of this decision is greater than perhaps appears
on first reading because more than just a refusal to nullify Florida
law was involved. Neither was this merely a case of refusing to
apply federal constitutional standards to state action. That was al-
ready required by Duncan.s6 The constitutional provision being dis-
cussed was not the fourteenth amendment but the sixth, which applies
directly to the federal courts. The result of this decision is not just
that Florida courts do not have to provide twelve-man panels but also
that federal courts are no longer constitutionally required to provide
such juries.6 7 What had previously been regarded as a constitutional
02 The Court dismissed these possibilities as meaningless especially if unanim-
ity is required. Williams v. Florida, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1906 (1970). The majority
also felt that any disability to a defendant would weigh equally upon the rosecu-
tion. There was no indication whether it was assumed that the prosecution deserved
an equal chance to tamper with the jury. Id. See also Note, Trial by jury in
Criminal Cases, 69 COLIMI. L. REv. 420, 425 (1969).
63 Supra note 57, and accompanying text.
64 90 S. Ct. at 1906-07. "In short, neither currently available evidence nor
theory suggests that the twelve-man jury is necessarily more advantageous to the
defendant than a jury composed of fewer members." (Emphasis added.) This
seems to be a rather curious choice of wording for a constitutional finding of fact.65 Id. at 1907.
66 See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
6c See note 19 supra.
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requirement was reduced to the level of court procedure.68 It is
submitted that the Court's decision to do so was in fact not based
on the reasoning of the majority opinion but rather, that the decision
merely reflects the justices' personal determination that the twelve-
man panel should not be constitutionally required.6 9 Because of this
dilution some effort must be made to determine upon exactly what
reasoning the Court based its decision.
Any discussion of what factors actually were the bases for the
decision must remain conjectural, but Justice Harlan raises some possi-
bilities in his dissent. It is his thesis that the basis of the decision
lies in an attempt to reconcile conflicts arising under the "selective
incorporation" doctrine. 70 As discussed previously, whenever the
Court has incorporated a federal constitutional right into the fourteenth
amendment it has required complete conformity by the state to the
federal law.71 Justice Harlan sees the Court faced with a divergence
between state and federal law in an area which had been incorporated
by Duncan, but it was a divergence which contained a great deal
of equity for the state's position. Rather than allow the divergence
and introduce conflict into the selective incorporation doctrine, the
majority chose to dilute a federal constitutional right so that uniformity
could be achieved.72
68 90 S. Ct. at 1907.
69 While this statement will obviously apply to some extent to almost every
opinion, in decisions such as Williams, where no other basis is given, this personal
determination seems to be the only factor. If the Court did in fact make its
decision upon this basis it is ironic that selective incorporation, which was con-
ceived to remove such personal or conscience considerations from the judicial
process, see generally 90 S. Ct. at 1909 (Black, J., dissenting), should result in
this decision.
70 90 S. Ct. at 1921 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "The only reason I can discern
for today's decision ... is the Court's disquietude with the tension between thejurisprudential consequences wrought by 'incorporation' . .. and the counter-pulls
of the situation presented in Williams .. " Id.
71 See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
72 90 S. Ct. at 1921 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "Can one doubt that had Con-
gress tried to undermine the common law right to trial by jury before Duncan
came on the books the history today recited would have barred such action?"
Id. Contra, id. at 1909 (Black, J., dissenting). In support of Justice Harlan it can
be demonstrated that at least one of the decisions made by the Court was to
dilute the constitutional right in favor of the incorporation scheme. This can be
done by an examination of the functional result of the Court's action. First, the
functional effect of the decision was to allow the Florida jury to remain the same
while making it possible to have smaller juries in federal courts. With this effect
consider the given factors with which the Court began: 1. a six-man jury in
Florida courts, 2. a twelve-man jury in federal courts, 3. a constitutional require-
ment of 2, 4. a judicial requirement of uniformity between 1 & 2. Of these factors
only 3 & 4 can be manipulated by the Court so as to effect 1 & 2, thus any
analysis must be concerned with possible arrangements of 3 & 4 in light of the
effect they might have on the two jury systems. This effect will depend upon
whether the Court retains them in their present form or alters them. There are(Continued on next page)
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As inviting as this conclusion is, it still begs the question of why
the majority decided as it did. The conflict between the con-
stitutional right and the incorporation scheme provides not a basis
but only a framework for the decision; its sole function served to
limit the options given to the justices and the entire discussion to
this point has only illuminated the factors which allowed the majority
to cast the problem in the mold of this conflict. Nothing as yet has
been said which would indicate why the Court, faced with this choice,
chose continuation of the incorporation doctrine. It is to this question
that attention must now be turned.
In attempting to discover a true rationale for the Court's decision,
one possible explanation relates to the inherent value of the incorpora-
tion doctrine which would cause a court to value it over a constitu-
tional guarantee. Exactly what the inherent value of the doctrine
may be is subject to varying interpretations and its effect upon the
Court would probably be difficult to ascertain. At any rate such a
thesis would demand a complete treatment of the doctrine in the
light of the circumstances of this case which is an undertaking beyond
the scope of this comment, as are other possible bases such as the
personal desire to see the continuation of a product of one's thoughts
or emotional attitudes toward the place of laymen in the private
perserve of justice. If these considerations are too illusive or intricate
to provide a basis for the opinion (beyond mere speculation) is there
any factor which may rationally be put forth as a basis for the
decision?
Perhaps such a basis may be found by turning once again to
the dissent of Justice Harlan. It is submitted that the most obvious
reason for the Court's choice lies in the overcrowded state of court
dockets across the nation. The courts of both the state and federal
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
four possible combinations which will produce an effect upon 1 & 2. These com-
binations and their effect are as follows:
A. Keep 3 & 4 unaltered-This will have the functional effect of requiring
twelve-man panels in both systems.
B. Keep 3 & alter 4-This will have the functional effect of allowing
six-man panels in Florida while retaining the twelve-man jury in
federal courts.
C. Alter 3 and retain 4-This will have the functional effect of allowing
six-man juries in either system.
D. Alter both 3 & 4-The functional effect of such a decision is beyond
determination. This would not seem to be the one sought because
such a decision would require an additional prompting factor in view
of the role 3 & 4 played in supplying the impetus for the considera-
tion of the case.
It would follow from this analysis that the functional decision of the Court was
C. or Justice Har]ar's thesis,
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systems are extremely overloaded.73 The backlog of cases is enormous
and many commentators place a major portion of the blame upon the
jury system.74 In an attempt to speed up the trial process courts have
experimented with the use of smaller juries in civil cases.75 The
results of these studies seem to indicate a possible reduction in the
time required for each trial along with a decrease in the expense.70
The primary focus of the authorities cited by the Williams Court
seemed to be these studies.77 As an indication of the impact of these
problems (and this case) upon the other courts in the federal system
and the speed with which this solution will be adopted, the federal
district courts for Kentucky have announced the adoption of six-man
juries in civil cases citing the expense, the press of cases, and Williams
as both the reason and justification for the action.78
In summary, this analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams ends with the conclusion that the necessities of judicial
administration provided the basis of the choice between options
limited by a self-imposed regime. As pointed out earlier, the Court's
choice was not between a twelve-man panel and a smaller one but
between disruption of the incorporation practice and dilution of a
constitutional right, and the majority chose to dilute the guarantee
because to do so would seem to lead to less congestion in the courts
while alteration of the incorporation scheme would further congest
the courts. The Court appears to have reasoned: (a) judicial practice
in the form of the incorporation doctrine demanded dilution, (b) ad-
ministration of the litigation process would apparently be facilitated
by dilution of the constitutional standard, (c) no reason was found
to prevent diluting the standard, thus (d) the standard should (could)
be diluted. Two things should be obvious: first, that the Court
omitted the first two steps of its logic from the opinion, and second,
that this logic does not and can not lead to the conclusion that there
73Id. at 1924-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See ZmSEL et. al., DELAY IN ia
CotrTs [hereinafter ZEiSEL] (1959).74 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Phillips, A Jurq of Six in All Cases, 30 CON. B.J. 354 (1956); Wiehl,
supra note 24, Note, Right to a Jury Trial of Persons Accused of Ordinance
Violation, 47 MiNN. L. REV. 93 (1962). Contra, Clark, supra note 23 at 5-6. See
also Merrill & Schrage, Efficient Use of Jurors: A Field Study and Simulation
Model of a Court System, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 151 (1969).75 ZEisEL 277. See also Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2
BOSTON B.J. 27 (1958).
76 Id.77 While some of the studies cited supra notes 74-75 are also cited in Williams,
supra note 57, the majority's use of them is as stated, to show the absence of any
reason preventing change. The opinion indicates the Court's awareness of the
tentativeness of the studies, most of which dealt with civil trials. 90 S. Ct. at 1906.78 The Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 20, 1971, § B, at 1, col. 6.
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is no relationship between the function of juries and the number of
jurors (or that verdicts will not change as the size of the jury is
decreased) because this is an assumption which underlies all of the
above and which, for all the Court's authorities tell us, may be well-
founded or unfounded, i.e. the Court doesn't really know. Thus, the
majority opinion deals only with the final step in the decision-making
process.
In light of the above it would seem that the Court should have
weighed the interest of judicial administration against the unknown
effect on verdicts on reduction of jury size. In the final analysis it is
the defendant who will suffer the possible ill-effects of either choice
and who is to say that the injustice of possible changes in jury verdicts
outweighs the prospect of long delays prior to trial? In this instance
the Court assumed the duty and as a part of that duty an obligation
to fully and accurately explain the basis of its choice. This obligation
was not met.
It is not the purpose of this comment to declare the Court's verdict
wrong but only to posit that not only was complete discussion of the
real rationale not provided but also that part of it was merely assumed
rather than decided.
If the preceding evaluation is correct, the decision takes on the
atmosphere of a trick done with mirrors. Putting all talk of con-
stitutional doctrines, legal precedents, etc. aside, the basic decision
which faced the Court was whether to allow reduction of the jury
panel. This can be translated as whether such a reduction would
have an adverse effect upon verdicts.79 In an attempt to answer
this question the Court proceeded upon the logic outlined above, but
such questions as relative value between constitutional right and
judicial procedure; between administration and jury function; his-
torical demands and verdict stability (which are the questions whose
answers produced each step in the logic) cannot be answered until
the effect upon verdicts of a change in size is determined. Yet as
pointed out, the functional answer to the basic question as provided
by the opinion was that there would be no change. Thus, we have a
question which is answered by a train of logic which is based on the
answer to the question. Can even mirrors produce such a trick?80
79 Such a translation can be made because regardless of other functions of
the jury, they and it can have no meaning apart from the verdicts rendered. Such
verdicts are the major, and perhaps only, means of communication for the jury as
a group thus any action which will effect the jury must be considered in light of
its effect upon verdicts.80 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this absence of explanation is the
uncertainty as concerns possible dilution of other constitutional guarantees in the
(Continued on next page)
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The final conclusion which arises from this quagmire is that
perhaps the Court acted unintentionally in omitting public discussion
of its decisional process. Perhaps it saw no relevance in discussing
the pre-decision logical step of resolving the conflict of Thompson
and the incorporation doctrine. Perhaps it deemed inconsequential
that its decision tacitly held that jury size is irrelevent to the jury's
role. The truth of these assumptions would make one pause to
contemplate the Court's capacity to act as a safe repository for con-
stitutional rights in this era of problems so complex, so equitably
balanced, so shrouded in uncertainty as to produce conflict among
all aspects of American life.
Conversely, were the Court cognizant of these decisional facets
while avoiding discussing either of them or the motivation of de-
congesting the courts, then the opinion was less than candid. A
full and open discussion, and a clear understanding, of the problem
is essential to a constitutional decision. Williams evinces a lack of
one, if not both, of these factors in allowing six-man juries based on the
rationale stated in the Court's opinion.
William L. Stevens
CoRPoRAlroNs-SEcumrrEs ExCHANGE ACr of 1934 § 16(b)-"SAiz"
DEvFmD.-A corporate insider1 granted an option on stock which he
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future when the Court is again faced with conflicts within an "incorporated" area.
See 90 S. Ct. at 1921-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Contra, id. at 1909 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Whatever the future may hold, in Williams the Court chose dilution.
1 Defendant was an insider by virtue of his ownership of over ten per cent of
the outstanding stock of the Cudahy Company. Such insiders are subject to the
provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, set out below:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than exempted security) within any period
of less than six months unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and
in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be con-
(Continued on next page)
